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PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY
IX. Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794)
ELIO MONACHESI
The author is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology in the Uni-
versity of Minnesota. His academic career began with an instructorship in that institu-
tion. His connection there has been continuous since, except as interrupted by two
year's research in Boston and in Italy under the auspices of the Social Science Research
Council. He has co-authored books entitled as follows: "The Rehabilitation of Chil-
dren", 1939 (with E. M. H. Baylor), "Elements of Sociology", 1951 (with Don Martin-
dale), "Analyzing and Predicting Juvenile Delinquency with the M.M.P.I.," 1953,
(with Starke R. Hathaway). The picture below is from Seidlitz' Allgemeines Histo-
risches Portrdt Werk. (Munich, 1889)-EDITOR.
CESARE BECCARIA
One seeks in vain for any clues in Cesare Beccaria's childhood and adolescence
which would be even slightly suggestive of the renowned essay on penal reform
that he was to write--an essay which showered upon him the acclaim and plaudits
of some of the best minds in the world in which he lived. As a matter of fact, Beccaria
in his early years did little more than to demonstrate that he was just ordinary
intellectually and not too much interested in nor concerned with scholarly pursuits.
It is true that he showed some flair for mathematics, but in general, his scholastic




Milan was the birth place of Cesare Bonesana, Marquis of Beccaria, and the dtea
of his birth was March 15, 1738. He died on November 28, 1794. Both his father and
mother were members of the aristocracy and amongst his ancestors were persons
who had achieved distinction in various fields of endeavor. Beccaria received his
early schooling at the Jesuit College in Parma and later studied law at the Uni-
versity of Pavia. He was graduated from the University of Pavia in 1758. The years
he spent under the tutelage of the Jesuits at Parma, were by his own admission and
evaluation, unprofitable. He rebelled against the authoritarian methods of instruc-
tion, and the inflexible and dogmatic demeanor of his teachers tended to make the
subject matter taught unstimulating and uhinspiring. For a period he found mathe-
matics attractive, this subject too, however, soon failed to intrigue him further. The
years he spent exposed to what was then considered the essentials of an education
of an aristocrat failed to produce in Beccaria a modicum of enthusiasm for scholar-
ship. All that these years seemed to create in the frustrated young man was lethargy
and discontent. These drab and stifling educational experiences may have played,
however, an important part in the creation of Beccaria's essay on penal reform.
Perhaps we are merely speculating when we suggest that the nature of Beccaria's
formal education directly contributed to the formulation of the arguments against
the status quo so forcibly recorded in his essay. It does seem, however, that in his
tightly knit and succinct indictment of the prevailing penal practices, one can dis-
cern protestations against unrewarding and detestable early educational experi-
ences.
With his formal education completed Beccaria returned to Milan and shortly
after developed an interest in philosophical works. This interest was apparently
kindled by Montesquieu's Lettres persanes. In this satire on the religious and political
institutions of Montesquieu's world Beccaria found that something which he had
so sorely missed before. The interest thus aroused led him to read and to digest the
philosophical writings of others and especially those of the French Encyclopedists.
In addition to philosophy he also began to read extensively of literature. Beccaria's
interest in penology and crime was, however, aroused by his friendly association
with two stimulating and intellectually keen brothers, Pietro and Alessandro Verri.
These two men, Pietro, a distinguished Italian economist, and Alessandro, a creative
writer of note attracted to them a group of young men dedicated to the study and
discussion of literary and philosophical subjects. It is to membership in this group
of brilliant young men, that met for study in the Verri home, that Beccaria owes
the incentive and the encouragement which eventually resulted in the essay on
penal reform. The environment provided by the intellectually stimulating discussions
which followed the serious study of the many social problems of the day aroused in
Beccaria an intense and fervent desire to question many aspects of eighteenth cen-
tury society. He found in Pietro Verri and in other members of the group the spark
needed to set in motion his creative powers.
Beccaria's first published work appeared in 1762 and was entitled: Del disordine e
de' rimedi delle monete nello stato di Milano nell' anno 1762. This monograph, of
practically no current significance, dealt with the plight and needed remedies for
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the monetary system of the State of Milan. It is however, in many respects quite
original and provocative and does demonstrate that Beccaria possessed the ability
to write clearly, and forcibly.
His Fmous EssAY
Although Beccaria seemed to have at last found the intellectual interests, which
he had never acquired during his formative years, amongst his imaginative and
scholarly friends, he was by no means consumed by an eagerness to write. As his
friend and mentor, Pietro Verri recounted, Beccaria tended to be lazy and easily
discouraged. He needed prodding and even had to be given assignments upon which
to work. It was such assignment, given to him by Verri, that eventually culminated
in the essay Dei delitti e delle pene. Beccaria, so the story goes, knew nothing of
penology when he undertook to deal with the subject. Fortunately, however, Ales-
sandro Verri, who held the office of Protector of Prisoners, was able to give Beccaria
the help and the suggestions he needed. Work was begun on the essay in March,
1763 and the manuscript was completed in January 1764. It was first published
anonymously in July 1764 when Beccaria was barely a little more than twenty-six
years of age. The essay was an immediate success, acclaimed almost by all who read
it. However, not all who read it agreed with Beccaria. The fact that the essay was
at first published anomymously suggests that its contents were designed to under-
mine many if not all of the cherished beliefs of those in position to determine the
fate of those accused and convicted of crime. The essay was a tightly reasoned
devastating attack upon the prevailing systems for the administration of criminal
justice. As such it aroused the hostility and resistence of those who stood to gain by
the perpetuation of the barbaric and archaic penological institutions of the day.
In order to appreciate the reason Beccaria's brief essay Dei delitli e delle pene,
created such excitement, enthusiasm and controversy one needs to recall the state
of the criminal law in continental Europe at the time the essay first appeared.
The existent criminal law of eighteenth century Europe was, in general, repressive,
uncertain and barbaric. Its administration permitted and encouraged incredibly
arbitrary and abusive practices. The agents of the criminal law, prosecutors and
judges, were allowed tremendous latitude in dealing with persons accused and con-
victed of crime, and corruption was rampant throughout continental Europe.
Fantastic as it may now seem to many now living in certain parts of the world,
the criminal law of eighteenth century Europe vested in public officials the power
to deprive persons of their freedom, property and life without regard for any of the
principles which are now embodied in the phrase "due process of law". Secret ac-
cusations were in vogue and persons were imprisoned on the flimsiest of evidence.
Torture, ingenious and horrible, was employed to wrench confessions from the re-
calcitrant. Judges were permitted to exercise unlimited discretion in punishing those
convicted of crime. The sentences imposed were arbitrary, inconsistent and depended
upon the status and power of the convicted. Punishments inflicted upon the more
unfortunate of the offenders were extremely severe. A great array of crimes were
punished by death not infrequently preceded by inhuman atrocities. Equality before
the law as a principle of justice was practically non-existent, but rather the treat-
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ment accorded persons depended solely upon the station in life of the offender and
upon the power that he and his friends could exercise over the agents of the law.
In practice, no distinction was made between the accused and the convicted. Both
were detained in the same institution and subjected to the same horrors of incarcera-
tion. This same practice prevailed in regard to the convicted young and old, the
murderer and the bankrupt, first offenders and hardened criminals, men and women.
All such categories of persons were promiscuously thrown together free to inter-
mingle and interact.
This was the status of the criminal law and it is against this backdrop of abuses,
vagaries, cruelties and irrationalities that we must place Beccaria's treatise in order
to appreciate its human and revolutionary character. Many other enlightened
humanitarians had, before Beccaria, protested against the prevailing customs, it
was, however, left to Beccaria to make the most succinct and effective plea for the
reform of the criminal law.
As one reads the first pages of Dei delitti e delle pene, one finds the roots of Beccaria's
thought and general intellectual orientation. Although well versed in the writings
of the French Encyclopedists, the essential reformative characteristics of his treatise
on penology stem from his study of the works of Montesquieu and his acceptance of
the contract theory of society so ably presented by Rousseau.
Thus, in the closing paragraph of the introduction to his treatise, Beccaria after
having briefly noted the deplorable state of the criminal law and of the administra-
tion of justice writes that, "The immortal Montesquieu had but briefly considered
this matter; and the truth, which is indivisible, has prompted me to follow in the
steps of this great man. Thinking men, for whom I write, will know, however, how
to distinguish between that which is his and that which is mine. I will consider my-
self fortunate, if like him, I can obtain the secret thanks of the obscure and peaceful
disciples of reason and inspire that gentle sentiment with which all sensitive persons
respond to whosoever pleads the cause of humanity."' In these words Beccaria not
only pays credit to Montesquieu as a source of many of his own ideas but also sug-
gests that his treatise is primarily intended to stimulate action designed to bring
about a sweeping reform in European criminal law.
The social contract theory of the state phase of Beccaria's thinking is revealed
in the opening paragraph of Chapter I of his essay. Thus he writes, "Laws are the
conditions whereby free and independent men unite to form society. Weary of liv-
ing in a state of war, and of enjoying a freedom rendered useless by the uncertainty
of its perpetuation men willingly sacrifice a part of this freedom in order to enjoy
that which is left in security and tranquility. The sum of all of the portions of the
freedom surrendered by each individual constitutes the sovereignty of a nation,
deposited in and to be administered by a legitimate sovereign. It was not, however,
alone sufficient to create this depository of freedom, it was also essential to defend
this sovereignty from private usurpation of every man who would want not only
that portion of the sovereignty that he individually had contributed but also that
which had been contributed by all others .... It is because of this that punishments
I Dei ddilti e delle pene (6th edition), 1766, pp. 12-13. This translation and others that follow are
not literal, but are, rather, attempts to put Beccaria's words in present day English.
[Vol. 46
PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY-BECCARIA
were established to deal with those who transgress against the laws."2 Thus, we note
that the basis of punishment lies, according to Beccaria, in the necessity to restrain
men from encroaching upon the freedom of one another defined and established by
the terms (laws) of a social contract.
The social contract theory of the State is the major premise of Beccaria's peno-
logical syllogism and if one grants the tenability of this basic proposition, the rest
of Beccaria's argument is not 6nly logical but also compellingly persuasive.
The right to punish transgressors is an essential consequence of the nature and
scope of the contractual relations of men in society. It, the right to punish, must
exist and be exercised if men are to be prevented from disrupting their orderly social
existence. But Beccaria, following Montesquieu, warns that every punishment which
is not founded upon absolute necessity is tyrannical. Punishment is legitimate only
when it is employed by the Sovereign to defend the sovereignty of all against the
depredation of any single individual. The right to punish should be exercised only
by the Sovereign when it is necessary to defend the liberty and rights of all the
people.
Having set forth this basic principle Beccaria then proceeds to suggest that if it
is accepted certain consequences inevitably follow. First, he declares that punish-
ment for crime is established only by law and the power to enact penal laws can only
be vested in the "Legislator", who represents all members of a society. No magis-
trate, who is himself a member of society, can with any justification inflict upon
another any penalty not ordained by law. Nor can any magistrate, regardless of
circumstances, either increase or decrease, or change in any fashion, the punishment
prescribed by law. It is the "Legislator" that determines the penalties and it is the
duty of magistrates to inflict such penalties exactly as they have been prescribed.
The second consequence following the acceptance of the principle is that the laws
of a society apply equally to all members of society regardless of their station. This,
Beccaria, indicates stems from the contractual nature of society. Exceptions to this
all binding principle cannot be tolerated since to do so would in effect result in en-
couraging the development of anarchy.
Further, the Sovereign can enact laws which are general in scope and in applica-
bility, binding upon all members of society. He cannot, however, judge whether any
specific person has violated the terms of the social contract. If he should attempt to
play such a role, it would divide society into two parts; one part represented by
the Sovereign who would be the accuser and affirm that a violation of the terms of
the contract had occurred, and the other part consisting of the accused, who in turn
would deny that a violation of contract had actually taken place. It is, therefore,
necessary, Beccaria suggests, that a third party be given the duty of determining
whether in fact a violation had occurred. In short, a magistrate is needed to resolve
the issue from whose findings of the fact no appeal should be permitted and which
consist of a simple negation or affirmation of the fact.
A third consequence deduced from Beccaria's major premise centers upon the
severity of punishment. Beccaria states if it can be demonstrated that severe punish-
20p. Cit., pp. 13-14.
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ment, although not in itself contrary to public welfare, is useless in the prevention
of crime such severe punishment is contrary to enlightened reason and justice.
Further, since judges or magistrates are not legislators, they have no right or
authority to interpret penal laws. This is the function of the Sovereign who repre-
sents all members of a society. The task of judges consists in determining whether a
person has or has not acted contrary to law. And in doing so, judges should conduct
the inquiry by adhering strictly to the rules of logic. Decisions should be in the form
of a syllogism wherein the law constitutes the major premise and the action of the
individual whether it be or not be in conformity with the law, the minor premise.
To punish or not to punish, or to grant freedom, should be the conclusion. For judges
to go beyond the limits circumscribed by the rules of syllogistic reasoning results
in usurpation of the power of legislators and in the introduction of ambiguity and
uncertainty into the judicial process. Judges should never be permitted to interpret
the laws but should confine their work to the application of laws. The inequities that
may arise from a policy of strict application of penal laws, cannot, according to
Beccaria be compared in their untoward effect with the inequities that are the re-
sults of a policy which permits judges to interpret them. Such a policy produces
intolerable conditions wherein persons are placed at the mercy of the whimsical and
venal emotions of magistrates. The power to remedy the untoward effects of existent
laws should be vested in legislators and not in judges. It is only under such a govern-
mental system, that it is possible to obtain the maximum security for the life, prop-
erty and freedom of persons.
To insure that judges keep within their proper and prescribed sphere of action is
not enough. Beccaria declares that laws, penal and otherwise must be written in a
anguage so as to render them completely understandable to the people. Obscuran-
tism in the law paves the way for interpretation and despotism. "The more widely
known and widely understood is a code of laws the lesser the number of crimes,
because, and undoubtedly, ignorance of the laws and the uncertainty of the con-
sequences of transgressions of laws facilitates the expression of human passions."'
By implication a society without writing can never attain a fixed form of govern-
ment in which power to govern is vested in the whole and not in any single part of
this whole, and in which the laws are not subject to alteration or subversion in the
interest of the few.
Up to this point we have tried to outline in brief the essential and central ideas of
Beccaria's treatise. These basic propositions constitute the major motifs of his argu-
ment and, if one grants Beccaria their tenability the remainder of his essay is an
exposition of their logical implications. The structure he erected on these founda-
tions will be found to be a devastating and logically reasoned assault upon the short-
comings and inhuman inconsistencies of the criminal and penal law of his day.
uVirY AND How PuNisH?
Why should crimes be punished? How should crimes be punished? These are the
important questions to which Beccaria next devotes attention. Again, briefly, he
declares that the necessity for punishment of crimes is inherent in the compact
consummated when men agreed to live together. Men are by nature self-seeking and
3Op. cit., p. 28.
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motivated to gain all that they can from one another. These self-centered individual-
ists must, however, be kept within bounds if the society they willingly created is to
endure. It is therefore necessary to find a method to achieve this end and punish-
ment is that method. To Beccaria, the primary purpose of punishment is to insure
the continued existence of society. Furthermore, the amount and nature of punish-
ment inflicted against transgressors should vary in proportion to the degree to which
an act of an individual endangers the existence of society. It is, Beccaria believes,
in the common interest of all members of society that crimes should not be committed
and that crimes should be prevented. It becomes necessary, therefore, to provide
legislators with means to achieve these objectives. The goals or objectives can be
attained by the enlightened utilization of punishment which should be inflicted in
measures commensurate with the effects of the crime upon society. It follows that
the more threatening the crime is to societal welfare and existence, the more severe
the punishment inflicted should be. The only measure of the seriousness of crimes
is the amount of harm done to society.
Beccaria, next turns his attention to a classification of crimes. Three categories
of crimes are noted, based on varying degrees of injury done to society by their
perpetrators. The first category consists of crimes considered to be most injurious
to society. Such crimes as high treason, or acts of an individual against the State
or its representatives are considered by Beccaria to be most serious since such crimes
threaten the existence of all members of society. Second in seriousness and in im-
portance are crimes that injure the security and property of individuals. The third
category of crimes are those that are disruptive of public peace and tranquility,
such as riots, rabble rousing, inciting disorder, etc. These categories of crimes, as
indicated, are considered to represent different degrees of harm to society and to its
members, and as such, should carry different penalties whose severity would differ
as the seriousness of the crime differs.
The essential end of punishment is not, says Beccaria, to torment offenders nor to
undo a crime already committed. It is rather, to prevent offenders from doing further
harm to society and to prevent others from committing crimes. Punishment is thus
looked upon as an educative process and the types of punishments selected and how
they are imposed should always be done so as to make the greatest impact and the
most enduring impression upon all members of society, while inflicting the least
pain on the body of the offender.
To be effective as a deterrent to crime, punishment should be both prompt and
inevitable, applied to all alike for similar crimes. It is not cruelty nor severity,
Beccaria believes, that renders punishment an effective deterrent, but rather its
certainty. To this end, Beccaria suggests that the accused should be tried as speedily
as possible.in order to reduce to a minimum the time that elapses between the com-
mission of the crime and its punishment. This Beccaria declares will produce a more
lasting effect and tend to strengthen the association between crime and punishment.
He further believes that the sought-for connection between crime and punishment
can be made more impressive where it is possible to make the punishment analogous
to the crime. It is for this reason that Beccaria questions the utility of punishing
lesser crimes in the obscurity of prisons.
It is the strength of the association of crime and punishment that Beccaria be-
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lieves to be the most effective deterrent. It is not the severity of punishment but
rather its certainty that leaves a lasting impression on the minds of men. He con-
tends therefore, that punishments that are severe, cruel and inhuman do not pre-
vent crime. As a matter of fact he argues that extremely severe penalties actually
encourage persons to commit crimes. Thus, he states, "The certainty of punishment,
even though it [punishment] be moderate will always make a stronger impression,
than the fear of one more severe if it is accompanied by the hope that one may es-
cape that punishment, because men are more frightened by an evil which is in-
evitable even though minor in nature. Further, if the punishment be too severe for
a crime men will be led to commit further crimes in order to escape punishment for
the crime. ' 4 He suggests that history indicates the existence of an association be-
tween inhuman and violent punishments and the most atrocious and bloody of
crimes, for the legislators and offenders were both motivated by the same ferocious
spirit. "As punishment becomes more cruel and more severe, the minds of men...
grow more hardened and calloused .... In order to insure that a penalty will pro-
duce the desired effect it is sufficient to provide that the evil attendent the penalty
exceeds the good expected of the crime.' 5 In every calculation of the excess of evil
over good, it is necessary to include the certainty of the penalty and the denial of
the expected advantage produced by the crime. Anything that goes beyond is su-
perfluous and is therefore tyrannical.
Tn DEATH PENALTY
The death penalty is next considered by Beccaria and he argues that it is neither
legitimate nor necessary. He proposes that men in forming the social compact did
not deposit with the Sovereign their right to life. To have done so would have been
illogical since the primary reason for the creation of society was to better insure
the right of men to live. Life is the greatest of all human good and no man willingly
gives to another man the authority to deprive him of his life.
If, as Beccaria has contended, the only reasonable basis of punishment is its effec-
tiveness as a deterrent of crime then the death penalty must be considered useless.
The death of an offender is a passing spectacle leaving no enduring impression upon
those who witness the execution. Penalties which are continued over a period of time
and which are known to be continuous are, according to Beccaria, much more effica-
cious than penalties which are merely momentary. Capital punishment, even though
it be inflicted in a most cruel fashion cannot be made lasting beyond a certain point-
the victim eventually dies, and though spectators are shocked and revolted by the
spectacle, the fear aroused in them is only passing in its effect. It is the anticipation
of continued suffering and terror that is the more efficient as a method of deterrence.
But even then Beccaria warns that the severity of punishment should be just enough
to prevent others from committing crimes rather than to torment the criminal.
The death penalty is unreasonable on another score. The execution of an individual
though it may be authorized by law is an act of violence and barbarity. It repre-
sents an injustice in that it renders an act legitimate in payment for an equivalent
4Op. cit., p. 113.
6 Op. cit., p. 114.
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act of violence. Its infliction is no more than homicide even though it is in repay-
ment of homicide. It constitutes an act of ferocity intended to curb ferocity.
ADMNSTRATION OF JUsTIcE
Beccaria next duvotes attention to a consideration of several of the procedural
phases of the administration of criminal justice. He is outspoken regarding many
of the abuses residing in the pre-conviction practices of his day. To Beccaria the
use of torture to extract confessions from offenders is intolerable and should never
be permitted. No one, he insists, has the right to maltreat or punish an individual
until after he has been convicted. The utilization of torture before and during the
trial of an accused is looked upon as an infamous test of the truth and a completely
barbaric custom. He contends that no one is a criminal until he is found guilty of
having committed a crime, consequently, to punish a person before he has been duly
found guilty is to impose upon that person punishment which goes far beyond any
reasonable limit. The employment of torture makes pain and suffering, rather than
established evidence, the test of truth.
Beccaria is also unalterably opposed to the utilization of secret accusations. Where
such practices exist they constitute proof of the weakness of government, and render
men false and treacherous. No one can effectively defend himself against secret
accusers and Beccaria believes that the practice cannot be justified on any count.
Beccaria strongly believes in public accusations followed by a public trial of the ac-
cused to determine the falsity or validity of the accuser and the accusation. All
trials, he insists, should be public and every man should be tried by his peers. Differ-
ences in rank or station should be disregarded when the life, liberty and fortune of
an individual is in question. On such matters class differences should not be the basis
upon which the guilt or innocence of a citizen is decided. Beccaria, does however,
suggest that in crimes involving the offence of one citizen against another one half
of those who try the case should be peers of the accused and one half be peers of the
person offended. It is through this means that Beccaria hopes to achieve that im-
partiality necessary to a fair trial. The accused should also be given the right to ex-
clude up to a point, a number of judges whose impartiality he has reason to question.
PREVENTION OF CRIME
"It is better to prevent crimes, then to punish them."16 This, Beccaria believes to
be the basic character of good legislation which in actual practice means leading men
to the attainment of maximum happiness and minimum misery. How would you
then prevent crimes? First, enact laws that are clear and simple and let them apply
equally to all men. These laws must be for all and not in favor of nor against any
class or any segment of society. They should also be feared, but the law alone must
be feared and not men, for the fear of men, Beccaria argues, is a source of crime.
The laws should also be certain so as to render the consequences of crime not prob-
lematical but rather inevitable. It should be the primary interest of magistrates to
insure the observance of laws rather than to punish their violation.
Would you prevent crime? Beccaria again asks. Then reward virtue-make virtue
6Op. cit., p. 188.
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a desired goal of men. But more than this is needed to prevent crime. Every effort
should be made to increase and extend knowledge, since, Beccaria believes that hu-
man liberty should be accompanied by enlightenment. The most effective method
for the prevention of crime is a perfect system of education.
De delitti e delle pene ends with the following admonition: "So that any punish-
ment be not an act of violence of one or of many against another, it is essential
that it be public, prompt, necessary, minimal in severity as possible under given
circumstances, proportional to the crime, and prescribed by the laws."7
CONCLUSION
The above briefly discussed essentials of Beccaria's penal philosophy made a
tremendous impact upon the enlightened and kindred minds of his day. His book,
as already noted, was an immediate success in most of Europe. The acclaim it re-
ceived was not because its contents were exclusively original, as a matter of fact,
many of the reforms Beccaria advocated had been proposed by others, but rather
because it constituted the first successful attempt to present a consistent and logically
constructed penological system--a system to be substituted for the confusing, un-
certain, abusive and inhuman practices inherent in the criminal law and penal sys-
tem of his world. His brief treatise was in many respects propagandistic and a well
reasoned attack on the prevailing customs. It called for sweeping reforms in all
phases of the administration of criminal justice. The book, easily read, and exception-
ally lacking in the usual trappings of pedantry was most opportune and formulated
in a convincing fashion the hopes and desires of a great many vigorous and out-
spoken reformers of his day. It had the power to rally to the cause it pleaded the
energies and efforts of most of the enlightened minds of the eighteenth century
Europe. Beccari's slim but potent book was a success primarily because it advocated
changes deemed desirable and supported by public' opinion. It appeared at a moment
marked by a growing revolt against despotism and absolutism-it was the product
of an era given to the serious questioning of the sanctity and utility of prevailing
social institutions. There are reasons for believing that the essay would have failed
to impress or to have attracted but passing attention had it not appeared when it
did. Europe was ready for it in 1764 and what Beccaria said in it was employed to
assault and eventually destroy many of the customs and traditions of eighteenth
century society by the protagonists of a new order. Chief amongst these was the
brilliant and able Voltaire, who, perhaps, more than anyone else prepared the way
for the implementation of the reforms that Beccaria proposed.
Without such perspective the present-day reader of Beccaria's essay is quite apt
to see little that is new or striking in the essay, since what Beccaria proposed and
so ably argued for in 1764 has been in great part achieved in the modern world.
We must, however, remember that it was Beccaria's rapier-like thrusts at the bar-
barism and inhumanity of the penology of his day that played a tremendously
significant role in bringing about the present day penal practices. It is not an exag-
geration to regard Beccaria's work as being of primary importance in paving the
7Op. cit., p. 205.
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way for penal reform for approximately the last two centuries. The reader will find
proposed in his essay, practically all of the important reforms in the administration
of criminal justice and in penology which have been achieved in the civilized world
since 1764.
With the publication of Dei delitli e delle pene Beccaria's literary productivity
comes rather abruptly to an end. Mter a visit to Paris in 1776, he was appointed
Professor of Political Economy in the Palatine School of Milan in 1768, and held
this post for only two years. The lectures he delivered on political economy were
collected and published (1804) ten years after his death and represent his only other
major published creative work.
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